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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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currently researches and publishes on international economics, defense economics, health 
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international academic organizations, institutions and conferences. Dr. Amara is the author of the 
forthcoming book Economic Development and Post Conflict Reconstruction and co-editor of Military 
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received her BS in mathematics (1982), BA in Russian (1983), and MS in computer science (1986) 
from the University of Arizona; in addition, she received an MS (1995) and PhD (2000) in information 
and computer science from the University of California, Irvine. Dr. Morse has worked in the computer 
industry for over 25 years, specializing in the areas of simulation, computer security, compilers, 
operating systems, neural networks, speech recognition, image processing, and engineering process 
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and standards, and 24 years as a computer security professional in computer security design, 
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enterprise-wide intrusion detection. [david.drake@jhuapl.edu] 
Abstract 
The current state of practice in program risk assessment relies on the best judgment of 
program management and systems engineering to identify and qualitatively assess the 
nature and probability of risks. While there are best practices and lessons learned upon 
which the risk assessment process can rely, the process is still heavily qualitative and is 
performed by program management and systems engineering staff that are inherently 
optimistic about program success. As a result, risks and their consequences are frequently 
underestimated. We propose a methodology that actively collects, and continuously and 
quantitatively analyzes, metrics that are earlier indicators of risk than cost and schedule slips. 
This methodology includes 
 the application of web-based technologies for collection and analysis, 
 a quantified risk cloud and monetized risk thresholds, 
 establishing a readily accessible knowledge base of previous program failures, and 
 new metrics to be collected closer to the source of risk. 
Background 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that FY2008 acquisition 
costs for major defense programs grew by $296 billion, an increase of 25% over initial 
estimates (GAO, 2009). The 2011 version of this same report (GAO, 2011) found that 
the total acquisition cost of the programs in DOD’s 2010 portfolio has 
increased by $135 billion over the past 2 years, of which $70 billion cannot be 
attributed to quantity changes. A small number of programs are driving most 
of this cost growth; however, half of DOD’s major defense acquisition 
programs do not meet cost performance goals agreed to by DOD, the Office 
of Management and Budget, and GAO. 
The goal of this paper is to provide a better approach to early detection of program 
failure, allowing early program termination or course correction. Based on our experience on 
multiple programs of various sizes, we conclude that, despite programmatic assertions to 
the contrary, risk management is often static and superficial. It is one of the areas of 
program management that is not well supported by tools that produce quantitative, 
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repeatable results. And such tools are only possible if they are supported by a knowledge 
base of previous program failures and lessons learned. Our thesis is that technology and 
collaborative techniques have evolved to the point that a quantitative, data-driven approach 
is now more feasible than it has been in the past. This data should come from two sources: 
1. data captured from previous program failures, and 
2. crowd-sourced data from program performers. 
We believe that such a knowledge base and tool would improve the process of 
understanding and evaluating risk within acquisition programs to 
 reduce program failures, cost and schedule overruns, and unanticipated 
technical and managerial roadblocks; 
 better anticipate the full program undertaking; 
 prevent repeating historical lessons learned; and 
 provide a more accurate risk analysis to existing programs to have a clearer 
understanding of its areas of predictability and unpredictability. 
Current Risk Management 
Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrate a traditional Continuous Risk Management (CRM) 
process for acquisition (NASA, 2000).1 Unfortunately, this process is often more theoretical 
than actual. We believe our proposed approach will make it more feasible to realize this 
process. 
 
Figure 1. Continuous Risk Management Process 
                                                
1 The Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition (2006) advocates a process that is only slightly different, 
placing risk mitigation plan implementation (control) before tracking. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=54 - 
=
Table 1. Continuous Risk Management Activities 
Activity Description 
Identify State the risk in terms of condition and consequences; capture the context of the risk (e.g., what, when, where, how, and why). 
Analyze Evaluate risk probability, impact/severity, and time-frame (when action needs to be taken); classify/group with similar/related risks; and prioritize. 
Plan 
Assign responsibility, determine approach (research, accept, mitigate, or 
monitor); if risk will be mitigated, define mitigation level (e.g., action item 
list or more detailed task plan) and goal; execute plan. 
Track Acquire/update, compile, analyze, and organize risk data; report tracking results; and verify and validate mitigation actions. 
Control 
Analyze tracking results, decide how to proceed (re-plan, close the risk, 





These are present in all of the preceding functions and are essential for 
the management of risks. A system for documentation and tracking of 
risk decisions shall be implemented. 
Current Tools 
Many of the commercial risk analysis/assessment tools available are focused on an 
enterprise’s information technology (IT; including information security) and facilities, for 
example, Central Computing and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA, n.d.) Risk Analysis 
and Management Method (CRAMM), Cost of Risk Analysis (CORA, n.d.), and 
Countermeasures (n.d.). This is not surprising since a commercial tool must demonstrate 
immediate value, which argues for focusing on risk domains where large data sets of 
discrete, identifiable risks exist. 
The Defense Acquisition Portal (n.d.) lists several risk assessment tools: 
 ACEIT (Automated Cost Estimating Integrated Tools) RI$K is one of a family of 
applications that support project managers and cost/financial analysts during all 
phases of a program’s life cycle that permits the user to conduct detailed cost-
risk analysis. It provides risk-adjusted, phased cost estimates, and performs risk 
calculations using eight probability functions to model uncertainty (beta, 
lognormal, log-t, normal, student’s t, triangular, uniform, and Weibull). 
 Army Cost Analysis Strategy Assessment (CASA) is a Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC)/Total Ownership Cost (TOC) decision support tool that includes risk and 
uncertainty analysis as a capability. 
 Cost/Risk Identification & Management System (CRIMS) is a system for 
identifying, tracking, and storing cost-risk information.2 
 Formal Risk Analysis (FRISK 4.00) supports cost-risk analysis by allowing the 
user to statistically sum Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)-element costs, 
represented by probability distributions, to obtain a probability distribution of total 
cost. This appears to indicate monetization of risk, but the most current version is 
from 2000. 
                                                
2 Current information on this tool was unavailable. 
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 NetIDEAS Inc.—Risk Manager supports the suggestions made in this paper in 
terms of using an online environment for team members to collaborate on risk 
identification, assessment, mitigation, and contingency planning. 
 Technical Risk Identification and Mitigation System (TRIMS) purports to have a 
knowledge base. However, information on its source was unavailable, and it 
does not appear to allow for collaboration outside the program using it. 
Our key observations about these tools are as follows: 
1. They are focused mostly on methodology rather than data. 
2. Many are not maintained actively, suggesting that they have established an 
initial methodology and have no impetus to evolve past that methodology. By 
extension, the tool that implements it does not evolve because the tool is not 
integrated with a risk management enterprise that tracks project results. 
Shortcomings of Current Practice 
In practice, we have observed the following shortcomings of risk assessments on 
actual programs: 
 Senior acquisition team members, especially management, have a vested 
interest in underestimating risk. This is not only because of their desire for 
continuity of the program, but because their role requires an optimistic attitude to 
lead their program team to success. 
 Engineers often recognize technical and programmatic risks, but cannot/will not 
risk raising concern for fear of retaliation or working at cross-purposes with their 
leaders’ success-oriented optimism. 
 Engineers are rarely included in the risk assessment process. 
 All acquisition team members are limited by their collective knowledge of risk. No 
matter how experienced the team is, team members cannot be expected to know 
or recognize all the risks that have ever resulted in acquisition failures or their 
indicators. 
 Risks are usually assessed qualitatively rather than quantitatively because team 
members lack the data to produce useful and realistic metrics. 
 Methodologies that look at cost and schedule (e.g., Earned Value Management 
[EVM]) are assessing symptoms, not causes. 
 Well-defined metrics are needed that are causally closer to symptoms or 
program risk. 
 The potential causal relationships between individual risks are often overlooked 
(i.e., a failure in one aspect of a program may have a cascade effect). 
Proposed Risk Analysis Snapshot for Acquisition Program Cost Projection 
A well-managed program can sustain some number of unexpected events and stay 
within budget. The question to be answered is, how many unexpected events, and of what 
magnitude, can be tolerated before program recovery is not achievable? By monetizing 
program risks, a probabilistic risk “cloud” can be calculated that permits understanding of the 
additional costs that unexpected events will incur for the program. Figure 2 provides a 
conceptual illustration of this risk cloud. When the risk cloud is added to the top of the 
expected costs, a clearer picture of the possible overall costs that a program may incur are 
seen. The challenge with this simple picture is that early in a project, when the current 
expended funds are low, the project budget has quite a bit of capability to absorb future 
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project changes due to unexpected decisions and project direction. The risk cloud above the 
project budget should be small at that time. As the project matures, and more funds have 
been expended, the size of the probabilistic risk cloud changes. 
 
Figure 2. Risk Cloud 
By conceptualizing the cost of a program in this manner, the upper financial limit that 
would be allowed, even through an overrun, can be defined. That limit can be called the 
Maximum Allowable Expenditure (MAE). If an overrun were borne by the customer, then the 
customer would define the MAE. In that case, the customer may justifiably terminate or 
significantly reorganize a program if the estimated average of unexpected events will drive 
costs above the MAE. If the contract were firm fixed price, then the MAE would be defined 
by the contractor, who would bear the cost of an overrun. In both cases, the customer, 
program manager, and contractor are very concerned with a risk cloud that approaches or 
surpasses the MAE. 
The project manager might also set the MAE low enough to prevent loss of 
incentives such as award fees. However, cost elasticity is not out of the question as the 
enactment of Nunn-McCurdy (§ 2433) so strongly demonstrates. One of the primary reasons 
to implement the recommendations in this paper is to avoid the type of visibility associated 
with program cost overruns and a required explanation to Congress. 
The MAE should vary over the lifetime of a program. Although uncertainty may be 
high, the risk of program failure should be low at the beginning of a program since there is 
greater time and budget to recover. Figure 3 illustrates the concept and projected evolution 
of the average and maximum of the risk cloud over the course of a program. 
 
Figure 3. Projected Risk Evolution Over Time 
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Notice that the MAE is rising until the “middle” or risk peak of the program and falling 
toward the end. Figure 3 clearly reflects perfect knowledge of how risk will evolve on the 
program, the type of knowledge a project manager (PM) almost never has in reality. The two 
key points about this profile are the following: 
 The change over time reflects the fact that the PM is anticipating there is a knee 
in the risk curve while keeping a close rein on the risk.  
 Any time the top edge of the risk cloud crosses or is about to cross the MAE, it 
should trigger a Program Scrub Decision (PSD) to cancel or reorganize the 
program. 
For this approach to be effective, the MAE profile needs to anticipate rising and 
falling risk. If the MAE were flat across the program timeline, and it were set too high initially, 
the program could get into trouble early without triggering a PSD. 
Figure 4 illustrates what could happen if the MAE were flat, but set too low initially. 
As the risk rises early in the program, a PSD is triggered. If the PM concludes that the risk is 
still manageable, the MAE is raised. But if the MAE profile is still flat, risk could continue to 
rise toward the end of the program rather than falling as expected without triggering another 
PSD. 
 
Figure 4. Program Scrub Decision Point 
A concept that needs to be better understood is where the knee of the curve exists 
(as shown in Figure 3; i.e., where to allow the greatest risk). This may be related to the 
Technical Readiness Level (TRL; DoD, 2011) of the program.  
Recommendations for a “Living” Risk Management Capability 
The quantitative process described in the following subsection is only feasible with 
the support of data and the infrastructure to make it usable and accessible by programs. 
Quantitative Process 
The quantitative process helps determine the type of data that need to be gathered. 
The process is as follows: 
 Identify an initial set of discrete risk elements. 
 Monetize the identified set of discrete risk elements based on their negative 
impact to project resources (duration/schedule, personnel, and materials) 
multiplied against the likelihood of occurrence (based on past acquisition 
project histories). 
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 Determine the mathematics of unifying the monetized risk across the project 
by determining the causal relationships between the discrete risk elements, 
based on the Eight-Stage Risk Assessment Methodology (Drake & Morse, 
1994): 
o If there is no causal relationship, then a simple summation across the 
monetized risk elements is sufficient. 
o If risk elements are mutually exclusive, then selecting the maximum of 
the risk is sufficient. 
o If risk elements are causally chained together, then the Eight-Stage 
Risk Assessment Methodology (or a similar calculation) applies, 
where the causal elements will raise the monetized value due to the 
likelihood of the combined probability of occurrence. 
 Continually track, update, and plan against risks. 
 Compare their risks to a substantial knowledge base of risks from previous 
programs. 
 Collect metrics to support quantitative risk adjustments. 
Data 
The portal should be backed by a knowledge base of previous acquisition successes 
and failures detailing 
 types of failures; 
 indicators of failures; 
 probability of failure based on indicators; 
 loss percentages based on failures; and 
 applicable risk treatments (remedies), including success and failure metrics. 
Infrastructure 
The web portal that supports the process in the Quantitative Process section will 
need the following functionality: 
 knowledge base of individual risks searchable on multiple criteria (e.g., phase 
technical/programmatic, technologies, drivers); 
 management tools for continually tracking, updating, and planning against risks; 
 metrics collection tools; and 
 open APIs for importing and exporting data. 
Usability 
The portal should have the following features: 
 Present potential risks from which the risk assessor can choose, reducing the 
effort to “think up” all potential risks, but still allow the assessor to specify new 
risks. 
 Provide recommendations and guidance on techniques that apply to 
assessing individual risks: for example, 
o Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), 
o Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
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o Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), and 
o Probability distributions appropriate for individual risks. 
 Integrate tools for collecting metrics, including anonymous polling of team 
members.3 
The portal should provide the following key outputs: 
 Cloud of probable cost based on risk and comparison of the risk cloud to 
o target cost, 
o actual cost, 
o MAE, 
o average risk, and 
o monetized risk. 
 Tracking and adjustment of risk probabilities based on previous program 
performance. 
o If the program has consistently underestimated risks, then future risk 
probabilities should be increased accordingly. 
 Versioning and tracking to enable rapid assessment of risk management 
success over time. 
Accessibility 
The portal should have role-based access control for 
 management, 
 engineers, 
 government program managers, 
 auditors, and 
 portal maintenance staff. 
Deploying and Employing the Portal 
While the application of this portal is technically outside the scope of our effort to 
improve the process of monetizing risk, the broad adoption of the proposed process and 
portal could factor into contracts in the form of specified government remedies (e.g., 
cancellation or re-bid) tied to specific risk metrics. 
Some Proposed (and Potentially Unpopular) Risk Metrics 
At the end of the subsection Current Risk Management, we asserted the need for 
metrics that are causally closer to symptoms rather than those that capture and record their 
impact later, such as EVM. Table 2 presents some proposed metrics from our personal 
experiences on programs of various sizes. 
                                                
3 Engineers are often aware of technical risks before PMs, since they are “closer” to the fault, and it is usually the 
engineers that have to relay the technical issue to the manager. 
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Table 2. Proposed New Risk Metrics 
Metric Description 
Work-to-noise 
ratio = work/(work 
+ noise) 
 What percentage of time do engineers spend actually performing 
engineering tasks vs. engaging in non-productive tasks (e.g., sitting 
in meetings/telecons to which they are not contributing nor from 
which they are getting actionable information)? 
 This metric can be collected anonymously through the proposed 
web portal. 
Task coupling  To what degree does completion of tasks depend on coordination 
between tasks? 
 This metric is related to a Gantt chart of the schedule, but cannot 
be seen on the Gantt chart. 
 Task coupling not only runs the risk of making both tasks late 
because they are interdependent, but simply trying to arrange the 




 A delay in one task delays a dependent task, causing a gap in 
tasking for some resources. 
o This could be observed as resource underutilization in the 
schedule. 
 Unlike machinery, engineers cannot just sit idle; they have to be 
retained and paid, so they have to perform work. 
o It must be value-adding or the costs are wasted. 
o They cannot be shifted to other, productive tasks because 
other resources have already been allocated, and putting them 




 This includes not just the loss of engineers, but the loss of the most 
knowledgeable and skilled engineers. 
 Engineers are not interchangeable resources. 
o When rumors of cuts start, the better engineers find new jobs 
and leave. 
o The loss of engineering skill is disproportionally larger than the 
loss of engineers. 
Energy drains  These are individuals who have psychological and substantive 
negative impacts on otherwise productive members of the team. 
o Leaders who demoralize subordinates to the point that they 
waste time complaining to each other rather than working 
o Team members who perform “negative work” (i.e., whose work 
is so poor that it takes more time to correct than it would have 
taken a productive team member to do it in the first place). 
These individuals also negatively affect morale because 
productive team members resent having to work harder to 
make up for the counter-productivity. 
Next Steps and Challenges 
We cannot switch from qualitative analysis to quantitative analysis without 
quantitative data. Central to the success of this approach is the collection and maintenance 
of data on previous acquisition risks and failures. While some of this data may be available, 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=61 - 
=
it will need to be evaluated to determine if it is sufficiently detailed and quantified to be 
transformed into failure records as described in the Data subsection. There are a number of 
potential sources coordinated by USD(AT&L). The data for major programs are collected in 
the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES, n.d.), a multi-part document reporting 
program information and assessments that provides an early-warning report to USD(AT&L). 
The DAES describes actual program problems, warns of potential program problems, and 
describes mitigating actions taken or planned. Another potential source is AT&L’s 
Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA) office (PARCA, n.d.), the 
central office for major defense authorization performance assessment, root cause analysis, 
and EVM. 
The success of the proposed portal is reliant upon continuous acquisition of new 
data that is a key challenge of any such enterprise. Program personnel must be incentivized 
to share experiences and may require anonymity to do so. New metrics should be solicited 
from the community. Acceptable values for some of the new metrics and their impact on risk 
(e.g., work-to-noise ratio) cannot be determined without data collection from multiple 
programs. 
Finally, this type of community effort succeeds and thrives when the community 
continuously rates the value of the elements of the enterprise. In this case, the applicability 
of identified risks and the accuracy of their associated metrics should be continuously 
evaluated and adjusted based on community feedback, improving accuracy over time. 
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